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Abstract
Using a common framework, we consider the two existing extensions of the lex-
imax criterion to infinite environments (Arlegi et al. (2005) and Ballester and De
Miguel (2003)), and show that, though the respective definitions of the rules and
their axiomatic characterizations appear to differ considerably, they actually pro-
pose the same extension of the leximax criterion to the infinite case.
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1 Introduction
Consider a given set of alternatives X over which there is defined a preference
ordering R. Consider also the problem of ranking all the possible finite subsets
of X. This formal problem can be understood in many different decisional
contexts. Specifically, if we interpret the subsets as opportunity sets, and take
the ranking of these to reflect the degree of freedom of choice with which
they provide the decision maker, the mentioned problem is a natural way to
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formally describe people’s valuation of freedom of choice. This is the focus of
many authors in the so-called freedom of choice literature. 2
Among the many different plausible rules one could imagine, one attractive
proposal is the leximax ranking, which is defined, and axiomatically character-
ized by Bossert et al. (1994). This rule compares any two sets of alternatives
by first looking at the best alternative in each set (with respect to R); if the
comparison is not decisive (the elements are indifferent), then the rule consid-
ers the second-best alternative in each set, and so the procedure continues, if
necessary, until there are no more alternatives to be compared in either or both
of the sets. In the first case, the set with the greater number of alternatives is
declared to be better; in the second, the two sets are indifferent.
The interest of this rule lies in the fact that it incorporates the intrinsic value
of freedom of choice (any enlargement of an opportunity set leads to a strict
improvement, unlike the standard indirect utility criterion), and the instru-
mental value of freedom of choice (preferences over the individual alternatives
in the set matter, unlike the purely cardinalist rule proposed by Pattanaik
and Xu (1990))
A major drawback of the leximax rule as established in Bossert et al. (1994),
however, is that it is not well defined for the case of infinite opportunity sets,
and is therefore not applicable in meaningful economic contexts, such as the
ranking of standard budget sets, which are typically compact (and infinite).
In an attempt to address this shortcoming, Ballester and De Miguel (2003) and
Arlegi et al. (2005) have separately proposed and axiomatically characterized
an extension of the leximax rule to the infinite case. The two proposals look
very different both in their formulation and their axiomatic structure. To the
best of our knowledge, moreover, these are, to date, the only two existing
extensions of the leximax rule to the infinite case.
The aim of this study is to prove that, despite their apparent differences, the
two extensions of the leximax are equivalent. In Section 2, we introduce the
basic notation and definitions. Section 3 presents the definitions of the two
extensions of the leximax as originally proposed by their respective authors.
Section 4 contains the equivalence result and its proof. In Section 5 we make
some comments on the logical relationship between the axioms used for the
characterization in each article, and finish with some concluding remarks in
Section 6.
2 The interested reader can find a complete survey of this literature in Barbera et
al. (2004).
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2 Notation and definitions 3
N and R denote the set of all positive integers and the set of all real numbers,
respectively, and Rn is the n-fold cartesian product of R. Let X ⊂ Rn be
a nonempty set of alternatives. In order to ensure that the axioms used are
independent, X is assumed to contain at least three elements.
Let R be a complete, reflexive, transitive ordering on X that can be repre-
sented by a utility function. The asymmetric and symmetric parts of R are
denoted, respectively, by P and I. The set of all subsets of X is denoted by
2X . For any A ⊆ X, F(A) denotes the set of the finite subsets of A, and ¬
denotes the logical negation.
Let  be a preference relation (complete, reflexive and transitive ordering)
defined on 2X . We write A  B to indicate that “set A is at least as good
as B”. We define the associated strict preference and indifference relations in
the usual way: ∀A,B ⊆ X, A  B iff A  B and ¬(B  A), and ∀A,B ⊆ X,
A ∼ B iff A  B and B  A.
We assume A  ∅, for all A ⊆ X, A 6= ∅.
3 The two extensions of the leximax criterion to the infinite case
First, a preference relation on F(X) is considered. We denote by l the finite
leximax criterion. Let {a1, . . . ak} and {b1, . . . br} be two subsets of X, whose
elements are labelled from best to worst (with respect to R). We consider
A l B when
i) there exists i ≤ k such that aiPbi and ajIbj, for all j < i, or
ii) aiIbi, for all i ≤ r and k ≥ r.
Next, two preference relations on 2X are considered. We denote by ∗L the
leximax criterion defined in Ballester and De Miguel (2003): For any pair of
sets A,B ⊆ X, A ∗L B if and only if for all Bf ∈ F(B) there exists Af ∈ F(A)
such that Af l Bf .
We denote by L the leximax criterion of Arlegi et al. (2005), who use a
3 There are some slight differences between the domains considered in each article.
Basically, the definition of Ballester and De Miguel (2003) is more general in that
it does not require the existence of a utility representation. In this article we have
adopted a common formal framework for the sake of comparability.
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more procedural definition, the presentation of which requires some additional
notation. Let u : X → [0, 1] be such that for all x, y ∈ X, u(x) ≥ u(y) iff xRy,
that is, u is a utility function for the preference relation over the alternatives.
Let A ⊆ X; we denote by u(A) the set {u(a) : a ∈ A}. Since u(A) is a bounded
set, there exists supu(A). If there exists a ∈ A such that u(a) = supu(A), this
a will be denoted by a1. In this case, we consider the bounded set u(A\{a1}),
then there exists supu(A \ {a1}); again, if there exists a ∈ A \ {a1} such that
u(a) = supu(A \ {a1}), this a will be denoted by a2, and so on.
Given a (possibly infinite) set X, the leximax ordering on 2X , L, is defined
as follows: First, for all A 6= ∅, A L ∅ ∼L ∅. Second, let A,B ⊆ X, A,B 6= ∅,
there are three possibilities:
1) a1 exists but not b1.
1.1 If a1Px, for all x ∈ B, then A L B.
1.2 If there exists x ∈ B such that xPa1, then B L A.
2) Neither a1 nor b1 exists.
2.1 If supu(A) > supu(B), then A L B.
2.2 If supu(B) > supu(A), then B L A.
2.3 If supu(A) = supu(B) then A ∼L B.
3) Both a1 and b1 exist.
3.1 If a1Pb1, then A L B.
3.2 If b1Pa1, then B L A.
3.3 If a1Ib1, it could be that:
3.3.a A = {a1} and B = {b1}, in which case A ∼L B.
3.3.b A = {a1} and B 6= {b1}. In which case B L A. Analogously, if
A 6= {a1} and B = {b1}, then A L B.
3.3.c A 6= {a1} and B 6= {b1}. In this case we consider the sets A \ {a1}
and B \ {b1}. If A \ {a1} and B \ {b1} are in one of the cases (from 1 to 3.3.b)
above, then we conclude A L B iff A\{a1} L B\{b1}. Otherwise, we repeat
the procedure as often as required to find k ∈ N such that aiIbi, i = 1, . . . , k,
and A \ {a1, . . . , ak}, B \ {b1, . . . , bk} are in one of the cases 1 to 3.3.b, and
conclude that A L B if A \ {a1, . . . , ak} L B \ {b1, . . . , bk}.
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The only case in which this algorithm does not come to an end is when, for
all k ∈ N, there exist ak ∈ A, bk ∈ B such that, akIbk. In that case, we say
that A ∼L B.
4 The main result
Theorem 1 The two preference relations defined on 2X , L and ∗L, are the
same.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let A,B ⊆ X such that A L B. We prove that A L B implies A ∗L B and
that A ∼L B implies A ∼∗L B.
First, note that, whenever the empty set is involved in the comparison, A ∗L
∅ ∼∗L ∅. Thus, we will concentrate on the remaining comparisons. For nota-
tional convenience throughout this proof, we assume that for the comparison
between the sets A and B, the first step of the procedure (whether a1 and b1
exist or not) is the decisive one. Note that if there exists a finite number of
pairs of initial elements which are indifferent two by two, and subsequently
this situation is not repeated, then the reasoning is not affected by removing
the initial pairwise equal elements.
We start by supposing that A ∼L B. There are two possible cases:
Case 2.3 Neither a1 nor b1 exists, and supu(A) = supu(B). Then supu(B) >
supu(Bf ) for all Bf ∈ F(B), therefore there exists a ∈ A such that aPb, for
all b ∈ Bf and for all Bf ∈ F(B). Thus, {a} l Bf and A ∗L B. Analogously
it is proved that B ∗L A. Consequently A ∼∗L B.
Case 3.3 Both a1 and b1 exist and a1Ib1. If A = {a1} and B = {b1}, then
A ∼∗L B. Consider now the case where for all k ∈ N, there exists ak ∈ A,
bk ∈ B and akIbk. Then, for any Bf ∈ F(B), we only need to consider the set
containing the |Bf | top elements of A in order to obtain A %∗L B. Similarly
B %∗L A, leading to A ∼∗L B.
Suppose now that A L B. If any of the cases 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 3.1 is at stake, the
following condition holds: there exists an element a ∈ A such that aPx for
all x ∈ B. In this case, obviously, {a} l Bf for any finite subset of B, thus
implying A ∗L B.
Finally, if case 3.3 is the relevant one, A 6= {a1} whereas B = {b1} with b1Ia1.
Consider then any element a ∈ A \ {a1}. Obviously, {a1, a} l B, where B is
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the only finite subset of B, implying A ∗L B. 2
5 The axioms
As pointed out earlier, the axiomatic characterizations of the leximax in
Ballester and De Miguel (2003), and in Arlegi et al. (2005) are different. Next,
we present the axioms used in each article and briefly comment on the logical
relationships among them. For the sake of fluency, we assume throughout that
R is a linear ordering. While this affects the wording of some of the axioms, the
logical relationships between them remain unchanged up to the corresponding
restatements of them. 4
Ballester and De Miguel (2003) characterize their extension of the leximax by
means of the following axioms:
Independence (In)
For all A,B ∈ 2X , for all x ∈ X \ (A ∪B): A  B ⇐⇒ A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {x}.
Robustness (Rb)
For all A,B,C ∈ 2X such that xPy for all x ∈ A ∪ B and all y ∈ C: A 
B =⇒ A  B ∪ C
No-Choice Situations (NCS)
For all A ∈ 2X : A 6= ∅ implies A  ∅
Existence of a Significant Element (SE)
For all A,B ∈ 2X , with A  B, there exists a ∈ A \ B such that the set
{b ∈ B : bRa} is finite.
Independence and Robustness are used by Bossert et al. (1994) for the char-
acterization of the leximax criterion in finite environments. These axioms are
also preserved also in Arlegi et al. (2005) for the characterization. 5 Further-
more, Arlegi et al. (2005) take (NCS) as a general assumption, and, instead
of (SE), propose the two following additional axioms:
4 We think that the discussion of both the motivation and technical details of the
axioms is beyond the scope of this note. We refer the interested reader to the original
articles.
5 Axiom (Rb) as presented by Arlegi et al. (2005) is slightly stronger, but their proof
also runs with the weaker version proposed by Ballester and De Miguel (2003).
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Dominance
Let A,B ⊆ X, if, for all b ∈ B, there exists a ∈ A such that aPb, then A  B.
Indifference
Let A,B ⊆ X. If there exist two one-to-one functions α : N→ A and β : N→
B such that for all k ∈ N, α(k) = β(k), α(k)Ra for all a ∈ A\{α(1), . . . , α(k−
1)} and β(k)Rb for all β ∈ B \ {β(1), . . . , β(k − 1)}, then A ∼ B.
Therefore, the difference between the two characterizations is that Arlegi et al.
(2005) use Dominance and Indifference instead of Ballester and De Miguel’s
(2003) (SE) axiom. Concerning the logical relationship between these axioms,
it can be proved that (SE) implies Indifference but not Dominance, and also
that neither Dominance nor Indifference separately implies (SE). Furthermore,
it can be proved that Dominance and Indifference together do not imply (SE)
(obviously, in the absence of the remaining axioms). Since this is just a brief
research note, we do not present the proofs. They are, however, available upon
request.
6 Conclusions
In this work we have proved that the two so far existing extensions of the lexi-
max rule to infinite environments are equivalent. Before this result was proved
we had two possible ways of applying the leximax in infinite environments,
each with advantages that were lacking the other: The leximax extension by
Ballester and De Miguel (2003) is more synthetic and “compact”. We think
it is mathematically more elegant and useful, for example, as a tool for the
investigation of further results. On the other hand, the proposal by Arlegi et
al. (2005) is more extensive and “procedural”, and perhaps easier to apply
as a quick means to decide how to rank any pair of given sets: According to
the criterion by Ballester and De Miguel (2003), in order to declare a set A
as preferred to another set B one has to be sure that for every finite set in
B there exists another finite set in A that is better in terms of the (finite)
leximax, which might not be immediate to check in many instances.
The equivalence result we have proved means that it is possible to use whichever
extension of the leximax best meets one’s requirements, in the certainty that
this will not affect the ranking of the set, or potential further results.
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